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Abstract 
 
This study assesses how market power in the African banking industry is affected by the 
complementarity between information sharing offices and information and communication 
technology (ICT). The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 
countries for the period 2001-2011. Three estimation techniques are employed, namely: (i) 
instrumental variable Fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (ii)  Tobit 
regressions to control for the limited range in the dependent variable; and (iii) Instrumental 
Quantile Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of market power. Whereas results from 
Fixed effects and Tobit regressions are not significant, with QR: (i) the interaction between 
internet penetration and public credit registries reduces market power in the 75
th
 quartile and 
(ii) the interaction between mobile phone penetration and private credit bureaus increases 
market power in the top quintiles.  Fortunately, the positive net effects are associated with 
negative marginal effects from the interaction between private credit bureaus and mobile 
phone penetration. This implies that mobile phones could complement private credit bureaus 
to decrease market power when certain thresholds of mobile phone penetration are attained. 
These thresholds are computed and discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 The positioning of this inquiry is motivated by four main tendencies in scholarly and 
policy circles, namely, the: (i) high penetration potential of information and communication 
(ICT) in Africa; (ii) recent introduction of information sharing offices throughout the 
continent; (iii) evidence of high market power in the African banking industry and (iv) gaps in 
the literature. We substantiate the points in chronological order.  
 First, compared to other regions of the world (e.g. North America, Europe & Asia) 
which have reached saturation points in terms of ICT penetration, there is still a great room 
for ICT penetration in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012; Tchamyou, 2016). This implies that 
policy makers can leverage on the underlying ICT penetration potential to address 
development challenges, inter alia: limited financial access and excessive market power 
owing to high informational rents.  
 Second, the advent ICT liberalisation has coincided with the introduction of 
information sharing offices (public credit registries and private credit bureaus) in developing 
countries (Mylenko, 2008). Such information sharing offices were previously concentrated in 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Information 
sharing offices which are also known as ‘credit reference agencies’ refer to institutions which 
collect data on commercial and individual borrowers’ obligations from a plethora of sources, 
notably: banks, credit card companies,  retail lenders, direct investigation, supplies and public 
sources. 
 Information sharing offices are necessary for financial access within an economy 
because they help to address information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. On the 
one hand, data from credit histories address concerns of adverse selection ex-ante of lending. 
On the other hand, ex-post of lending, information sharing offices serve as a market 
disciplining channel by preventing borrowers from defaulting on their debts. By reducing 
informational rents in the banking sector and rendering credit markets contestable, 
information sharing offices also have a theoretical role of reducing market power in the 
banking industry.  
 Third, a recent stream of literature has built on the underpinning that financial 
institutions in Africa may be enjoying a ‘quiet life’1 or abusing their market power (Boateng 
                                                          
1
According to the Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH), banks with substantial market power would devote fewer 
resources to enhancing access to finance. In other words, the hypothesis postulates that instead of powerful 
banksusing their favourable market position to consolidate intermediation efficiency, they would  tend to exploit 
such ‘market power’ to increase their gains or enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (see Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  From a 
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et al., 2016; Asongu et al., 2016a; Banya & Biekpe, 2017). For instance, Banya and Biekpe 
(2017) have recently shown that bank size is negatively related to banking sector efficiency, 
partly because lack of competition in the banking sector has also been established to decrease 
financial intermediation efficiency (Biekpe, 2011). Furthermore, despite being the continent 
with the most severe financial access constraints, Africa has not received the scholarly 
attention it deserves. As summarised in Appendix 1, apart from Ariss (2010) who has sampled 
some African countries, the bulk of literature on market power in the banking industry has 
failed to engage the continent.  
 This study contributes to the extant literature by assessing whether complementing 
information sharing offices (discussed in the second strand) with ICT (covered in the first 
strand) can address the concern of market power (raised in the third strand). It is important to 
reduce market power because prior studies have shown that it: lowers the volume of 
investment and savings; increases the cost of financial intermediation and ultimately 
decreases economic growth (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007). Conscious of the 
deleterious impacts of market power on economic prosperity, policy makers in both 
developing and developed nations have over the past decades implemented policies with the 
purpose of enhancing banking competition and reducing market power. Under the auspices of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, liberalisation of the banking sector has 
been the most prominent of these policies in Africa. These policy reforms have substantially 
affected the competitive landscape in the African banking industry, especially with the 
increasingly realisation that the introduction of credit information systems and ICT are 
facilitating financial access.  
 The main premise for reducing market power is that when lenders monopolise 
dominant positions within the market they may use these positions to increases their financial 
gains instead of improving the fundamental role of banks which is to transform mobilised 
deposits into credit for economic operators. It is relevant to note that, the policy of 
establishing credit registries and information sharing offices across Africa is expected to 
consolidate credit expansion, reduce information asymmetry, increase competition and boost 
financial intermediation efficiency within a market environment that is substantially 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
theoretical standpoint, it is expected that financial institutions with considerable market power will be associated 
with lower profit margins owing to economies of scale on the one hand and other advantages associated with 
banks of large size, on the other hand. However, in contradiction to these expectations, big banks can devote 
more resources to stifling intermediation efficiency and increasing their profits margins (Mitchell & Onvural, 
1996).  
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dominated by large multinational financial institutions like Standard Chartered, Barclays 
Bank, BNP Paribas and Société Générale (Boateng et al., 2016).  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The arguments and theoretical 
underpinnings are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. 
Empirical results and corresponding discussions are covered in Section 4 while Section 5 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Arguments, intuition and theoretical underpinnings 
There is a substantial bulk of the literature maintaining that consolidation and mergers 
are positive in improving bank efficiency (see Berger & Humphrey, 1994; Peristiani, 1997; 
Rhoades, 1998; Fethi & Pasiouras 2010).  Unfortunately, there is a growing body of African 
literature on the position that interest rate margins are lower in small banks compared to larger 
banks which may be abusing their market power (Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013)
2
.  
Accordingly, compared to small banks, financial institutions with substantial market power 
should decrease interest margins because of internalities and externalities from economies of 
scale. From a broad perspective, it has been established that larger banks are becoming more 
inefficient (see Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013)
3
. This paradox has led to 
growing concerns about the role of market power and bank size in improving financial access 
within the banking sector (Karray & Chichti, 2013).  
 Three arguments have been put forward to elucidate the paradox. First, it is argued that 
big banks could be using their market power to enjoy a ‘quiet life’ instead of increasing 
financial access (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). The second argument is that some large banks 
may be associated with substantial diseconomies of scale which engender inefficiencies, 
especially on the need for better organisation, management and coordination (Berger et al., 
1987; Noulas et al., 1990; Mester, 1992; Clark, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013). Third, a 
recent stream of African business literature is motivated by the assumption that big banks may 
be exploiting information sharing offices to increase their profit margins instead of increasing 
                                                          
2
Beck and Hesse (2006, p.1) have established that bank size significantly contributes to variations in margins and 
spreads in the banking sector. For example, in Kenya the high cost of loans is favorable to big banks compared 
to small lenders (Ngigi, 2013a, 2013b). Ahokpossi (2013, p. 1) has concluded that policies designed to reduce 
market concentration and promote competition would help lower interest margins in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
3
Karray and Chichti (2013) have recently investigated a panel of 402 commercial banks from 15 developing 
countries for the period 2000-2003 to establish that there are high levels of scale inefficiency among the largest 
banks.  
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financial allocation efficiency (see Asongu et al., 2016a; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). The 
present study is closest to the third argument.  
 On the theoretical linkages between information sharing offices and market power, the 
former increases interbank competition by making the banking sector contestable, since 
information that was formerly enjoyed by a privileged set of big banks can be available to all 
financial institutions (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). In essence, by reducing market power and 
rendering credit markets contestable, financial access is enhanced. Information sharing offices 
serve as market brokers by enabling inter alia: relaxation of credit constraints, efficiency in 
capital allocation and enhanced credit competition. In what follows, we discuss how ICT can 
complement information sharing offices to reduce market power. 
 First and foremost, ICT has been documented to be a natural instrument of information 
sharing offices (see Asongu et al., 2017). This is essentially because the latter uses the former 
in its information sharing activities. Such information sharing can reduce informational rents 
or data privileges that were previously enjoyed by powerful banks within the financial 
industry. Accordingly, large banks can use such privileged information to set the prices of 
loans above marginal costs with the purpose of boosting their profit margins. This theoretical 
narrative is in accordance with a stream of recent literature, notably: Bergemanny et al. (2015) 
who posit that the complementarity between information and market power is essential in 
understanding the distribution of prices and quantities which lead to economic equilibrium.  
Second, the complementary role of ICT in deceasing market power within the banking 
industry is similar to the relevance of ICT in stifling the abuse of power by the governing 
elite. The theoretical framework within which market power is reduced by ICT is consistent 
with Snow (2009, pp. 337-339).  According to the author, the historic dearth of information 
technology endowed the elite in positions of authority with the power of using privileged 
information to achieve personal gains. From the perspective of banking, such personal gains 
reflect a ‘quite life’: a concept already clarified in the introduction.  
 In the light of the above, the sharing of information by means of ICT can substantially 
reduce rents and secrecy barriers by inter alia: boosting transparency, increasing oversight 
and altering cost-benefit computations. The basis of this assertion is that the monopoly of 
information either by the elite in government (and by extension powerful banks within the 
banking sector) offers opportunities for abuse of power.  Therefore, the liberalisation and/or 
decentralisation of information by means of ICT networks theoretically limit such 
opportunities for abuse of power. This partly explains the intuition motivating the study given 
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that the introduction of information sharing offices in Africa has coincided with the 
liberalisation of the ICT sector. In a nutshell, the underlying postulations are broadly 
consistent with the evolving literature on the linkages between governance, ICT and the abuse 
of power by the elite with privileged information on the one hand (Boulianne, 2009; 
Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014) and the growing body of studies on the importance of 
ICT in garnering collective action against the abuse of power, on the other hand (Pierskalla & 
Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016).   
Motivated by the above underpinnings, over the past decades information sharing 
offices have been introduced across Africa in order to reduce information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers in the banking industry. Unfortunately, most of the literature has 
focused on the role of information sharing offices on financial access (Barth et al., 2009; Triki 
& Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2017), with little scholarly focus on market power. This study 
complements the existing literature by examining how information and communication 
technology (ICT) complements information sharing offices to affect market power in the 
African banking industry.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
This paper investigates a panel of 162 banks in 42 countries with data from Bankscope and 
World Bank Development Indicators for the period 2001-2011. The number of countries, 
banks and periodicity are due to data availability constraints. Accordingly, data on 
information sharing offices is only available from 2001.  
 In accordance with Ariss (2010), market power is measured with the Lerner index. The 
computation of the index which measures the magnitude at which banks set prices above 
marginal costs is discussed in the methodology section.  Higher Lerner indices indicate 
greater market power. 
In line with Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices are measured with 
public credit registries and private credit bureaus.  ICT is measured with internet penetration 
and mobile phone penetration. The choice of these ICT variables is motivated by the 
conclusions of Asongu and Moulin (2016) on their relevance in complementing information 
sharing offices to reduce information asymmetry for financial access.  
 The study controls for market-level features (GDP per capita growth, inflation and 
population density), bank-oriented characteristics (Deposits/Assets, Bank branches, loan price 
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and loan quantity) and the unobserved heterogeneity in banks: ownership (domestic versus 
(vs) foreign), size (small vs. large) and ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-Islamic vs. 
Islamic).  
 With regards to expected signs from bank-related characteristics, the following signs 
are anticipated. (1) Loan price should increase market power because higher interest margins 
also indicate the abuse of market power by large banks. (2) Whereas increasing loan quantity 
may be a reflection of reducing market power because interbank competition drives-down 
prices while increasing the quantity of loans, it is difficult to establish the expected sign since 
increasing loan quantity may also be the result of a cartel of banks deciding the amount of 
loans in circulation. (3)The ‘Deposit to asset’ ratio can either increase or decrease market 
power because it can simultaneously increase the quantity and price of loans. In essence, since 
the principal sources of financing for banks are deposits, a higher proportion of deposits 
among liquid liabilities could simultaneously increase the quantity of loans and interest rate 
margin.  (4) Whereas an increasing number of ‘bank branches’ is a measurement of 
competition within the banking sector, the branches could also be from a cartel of big banks 
dictating the laws in the banking sector. Hence, it is difficult to establish the expected sign of 
bank branches on market power.  
 As concerns market-oriented features, the following are worthwhile. (1) GDP per 
capita growth is used to control for business cycle fluctuations
4
. Unfortunately, the expected 
sign cannot be established with certainty because it is contingent on market dynamism and 
expansion. (2) Whereas high inflation may push some banks to leave the banking industry, 
low and stable inflation that are essential for investment can be an incentive for banks to set 
branches within an economy. In essence, inflation increases ambiguities in the economic 
environment and investors have been documented to prefer less ambiguous investment 
climates (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016). (3) Population density is 
likely to reduce market power because it offers investment opportunities in the banking sector 
for other banks.  
 On the signs of the dummy variables used to control the unobserved heterogeneity, (1) 
an increasing number of small banks is logically expected to reduce market power while (2) a 
growing number of domestic banks could either increase or decrease market power because 
the effect on market power is contingent on the co-ordination and organisation of issues that 
                                                          
4
 The relationship between finance and growth has been substantially documented in the literature (Owosu & 
Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b; Adjasi &  Biekpe, 2006; Gossel & Biekpe, 2014 ). 
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are related to inefficiencies. (3) The effect of compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-Islamic 
vs. Islamic) is also difficult to establish because the influence of banks in the financial 
industry depends on inter alia: (i) constraints in meeting customer needs and requirements 
and (ii) organizational capabilities of staff as well as the expansion and dynamism of markets.  
 The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 
discloses the summary statistics while the correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 4.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Estimation of Market Power (Lerner Index), 
 In order to estimate market power or the Lerner index, we use the stochastic frontier 
model of Battese and Coelli (1992). As argued by Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010), the model 
is better compared to other estimation approaches, especially techniques that are based on 
deterministic frontiers (Farrell, 1957; Aigner & Chu, 1968). The adopted model controls for 
the possibility that, apart from the firm’s own inefficiency, deviations between the frontier 
output and observed output could originate from other factors (e.g. measurement errors and 
stochastic shocks).  
Let us assume that, for firm i  at time t , productions costs are a function of output 
( Q ), input prices (W ), inefficiency ( u ) and random error ( v ). With the last two terms 
independent and identically distributed (iid), the logarithmic specification of the cost function 
can be written as follows: 
ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln  ,                                                                                      (1)
  
where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms are iid, following a normal 
distribution and a truncated normal distribution respectively. Hence, while itv  is 
²),0( vN  , itu  is ²),( uN  .       
In order to model the cost, we employ a translog function with three inputs and one output. 
The function first proposed by Christensen et al. (1971) and then extended to a multiproduct 
framework (Brown et al., 1979), has been substantially employed for the assessment of the 
market power in the banking literature (Koetter & Vins, 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; 
Ariss, 2010). The cost function is as follows:  
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where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are subscripts of banks and time respectively. C is the 
total cost,  Q  is the output, hW  are factor prices, while itu  and itv  are respectively the error 
and inefficiency terms.  
 In order to estimate the cost, three inputs and one output are specified.  Total operating 
cost is measured by overheads, output by total assets and inputs by the price of deposits, price 
of labor and price of capital
5
. The Lerner index is computed from the price and marginal cost 
(see Eq. 4). While the latter is computed from the translog cost function output (see Eq. (3)), 
the former is the price charged by banks on their output (total assets), computed as the ratio 
between total revenues (interest income plus net noninterest income) and total assets.  
it
it
h
hitQhitQQQ
itit
itit
it
it
it
Q
C
WQ
QQ
CC
Q
C
MC 











 

3
1
lnln
)(ln
)(ln

(3) 
 
it
itit
it
P
MCP
LERNER


,       (4) 
where itP  is the price charged by a bank on its output. Accordingly, in theory, the Lerner 
index can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1. 
 
3.2 2 Instrumentation and instrumental Fixed Effects estimations  
Four estimation techniques are employed, namely: (i) instrumental variable Fixed 
Effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (ii)  Tobit regressions to control for the 
limited range in the dependent variable; and (iii) instrumental Quantile regressions to account 
for initial levels of market power. The employment of multiple estimation techniques is 
consistent with data behaviour.  
 The concern about endogeneity in the independent variables of interest is addressed by 
instrumenting the underlying variables with their first lags. The instrumentation procedure for 
                                                          
5
 The price of deposits is computed by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, money market plus 
short term funding. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of 
capital is equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
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an information sharing office (e.g. private credit bureaus) and an ICT indicator (e.g. Internet 
penetration) are respectively in Eqs. (5) and (6) below. 
 
  titijti PCBPCB ,1,,    ,                              (5) 
where, tiPCB , , is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i at  period t ,    is a constant, 
1, tiPCB , represents  private credit bureaus in bank i at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term. 
  titijti InternetInternet ,1,,    ,(6)where, tiInternet , , is the internet penetration rate of 
bank i at  period t ,    is a constant, 1, tiInternet , represents  internet penetration rate in 
bank i at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term. The procedure of instrumentation in Eq. (5) 
consists of regressing the information sharing offices on their first lags. The corresponding 
fitted values are then saved and later used as the independent variables of interest in Fixed 
Effects, Tobit and Quantile Regression specifications. The instrumentation process is 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. 
 The panel Fixed Effects model is presented as follows: 
tiitih
h
htitititi WISOICTICTISOL ,,,
7
1
,3,2,10,    

 ,(7) 
where, tiL , is the Lerner index of bank i at  period t ;  is a constant; ISO , is an information 
sharing office (public credit registries or private credit bureaus);    ICT represents information 
and communication technology (mobile phone penetration or internet penetration); ISOICT , 
is the interaction between an information sharing office and an information and 
communication technology;W  is the vector of control variables  (public credit registries, 
private credit bureaus, ICT, loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, 
Population density, Deposit/Assets and Bank Branches); i is the country-specific effect and 
ti ,  the error term.  
 
3.2.3 Instrumental Tobit regressions  
 
 Given that the Lerner index theoretically falls between 0 and 1, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) may be inappropriate. Many authors have used a double-censored Tobit model 
to account for the limited range in the dependent variable (see Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; 
Koetter et al., 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010). Consistent with recent 
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literature (McDonald, 2009; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; 
Asongu & Le Roux, 2017), if there are no observations of either 0 or 1 for the Lerner index 
(which is the case here), estimating by a double-censored Tobit model is similar to estimating 
by a linear regressions model since the two likelihood functions coincide.  
 
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun & Sun, 2007) is as follows: 
 
tititi Xy ,,0
*
,   ,  (8) 
 
where *,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX , is an observed k1 vector of explanatory variables 
and ti, i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
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where is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of  *,tiy  
is missing when it is less 
than or equal to . 
 
 
3.2.4 Instrumental Quantile regressions  
 The specifications above are based on mean values of the Lerner index. Unfortunately, 
blanket policies which result from estimations based on mean values may not be effective 
unless they are contingent on initial levels of market power and tailored differently across 
banks with low, intermediate and high market power. We address the concerns of modelling 
exclusively on the conditional mean of the Lerner index with Quantile Regressions (QR) 
which enables the study to assess the investigated relationships throughout the conditional 
distributions of the Learner index (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger &Goel, 2009; Okada 
& Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013, 2017).  
 Furthermore, studies based on mean impacts with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) rely 
on the assumption of normally distributed error terms. Unfortunately, this  assumption does 
not hold when employing the QR technique because it is not founded on assumption that error 
terms are normally distributed. This  technique which is robust in the presence of outliers 
enables the investigation of parameter estimates at  multiple points of the conditional 
distribution of the Lerner index (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). 
The  th quintile estimator of the Lerner index is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (10) 
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where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quartiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are examined by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of the Lerner index or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                      (11) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the Lerner index. For the model in Eq. (11), the 
dependent variable iy  is the market power indicator while ix contains a constant term, public 
credit registries, private credit bureaus, ICT, loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita 
growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, domestic 
banks and Islamic banks.  
 Given that all estimation approaches are based on interactive regressions, we briefly 
engage some drawbacks that are linked to these types of regressions. Consistent with Brambor 
et al. (2006), all constitutive terms should be involved in the specifications. Furthermore, the 
corresponding estimates from interactions should be considered as marginal or conditional 
effects.The theoretical and practical underpinnings of Brambor et al. (2006) are broadly 
consistent with the suggestions with Balli and Sorensen (2013). Given that, squared terms of 
the interactive variables are not articulated in the problem statement we are investigating, 
quadratic terms have not been further considered in order to assess whether the purported 
interaction terms are not spuriously capturing left-out squared terms. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 Table 1 presents findings on Fixed Effects and Tobit regressions on the left-hand-side 
and right-hand-side respectively. Each modelling has two sets of specifications: the first on 
public credit registries and the second on private credit bureaus. Each set of specifications has 
two sub-sets of specifications pertaining to mobile phone penetration and internet penetration. 
No net effects of ICT in complementing information sharing offices to reduce market power 
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are computed for Table 1 because of the insignificance of marginal impacts. Most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 
Table 1: Reducing Information Asymmetry, ICTand Market Power (FE and Tobit) 
         
 Dependent variable: Lerner Index 
 Fixed Effects (FE) Tobit  
 PCR PCB PCR PCB 
 Mobile Internet  Mobile Internet  Mobile Internet  Mobile Internet  
Constant  -2.536*** -2.317*** -2.705*** -2.015*** 0.188 0.204 0.247 0.251 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.286) (0.253) (0.160) (0.148) 
Mobile Phones(IV) -0.004** --- -0.006*** --- 0.001 --- 0.00009 --- 
 (0.034)  (0.008)  (0.260)  (0.500)  
Internet (IV) --- -0.010 --- -0.009 --- -0.003 --- -0.005 
  (0.220)  (0.209)  (0.470)  (0.336) 
PCR (IV) -0.014 -0.014 --- --- 0.013 0.005 --- --- 
 (0.585) (0.384)   (0.549) (0.711)   
PCB (IV) --- --- 0.001 0.002 --- --- 0.001 -0.0002 
   (0.828) (0.694)   (0.819) (0.949) 
PCR(IV) ×Mobile Phones(IV) 0.0001 --- --- --- -0.00009 --- --- --- 
 (0.582)    (0.661)    
PCB(IV) ×Mobile Phones(IV) --- --- 0.00007 --- ---- --- -0.000005 ---- 
   (0.136)    (0.921)  
PCR(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- 0.0004 --- --- --- -0.0001 --- --- 
  (0.340)    (0.814)   
PCB(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- --- --- 0.0003 --- --- --- 0.0001 
    (0.265)    (0.724) 
GDPpcg 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.0005 
 (0.436) (0.333) (0.611) (0.515) (0.884) (0.897) (0.737) (0.942) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.007 -0.008* -0.008* -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008* 
 (0.120) (0.112) (0.073) (0.071) (0.282) (0.149) (0.142) (0.089) 
Pop. density -0.014** -0.013* -0.013* -0.016** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.00001 0.00002 
 (0.019) (0.083) (0.060) (0.039) (0.551) (0.540) (0.945) (0.924) 
Deposit/Assets 0.111 0.152 -0.047 0.001 0.139 0.173 0.136 0.170 
 (0.659) (0.561) (0.854) (0.995) (0.333) (0.241) (0.347) (0.256) 
Bank Branches -0.016 -0.021 -0.022 -0.035 0.004 0.016* 0.006 0.017* 
 (0.531) (0.477) (0.385) (0.285) (0.585) (0.065) (0.322) (0.050) 
Price of Loan 7.382*** 7.846*** 8.107*** 8.539*** 2.231*** 2.191*** 1.851*** 1.877*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Quantity of Loan  0.953*** 0.821*** 0.992*** 0.827*** -0.020 -0.017 -0.023 -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.337) (0.416) (0.271) (0.358) 
Small Banks  --- --- --- --- -0.156** -0.123 -0.145* -0.121 
     (0.040) (0.123) (0.045) (0.125) 
Domestic Banks --- --- --- --- 0.202*** 0.197*** 0.205*** 0.196*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Islamic Banks  --- --- --- --- 0.071 0.016 0.069 0.017 
     (0.668) (0.936) (0.678) (0.933) 
         
Net effect of the Mobile Phone na --- na --- na --- Na --- 
Net effect of the Internet  --- na --- na --- na --- na 
         
R² within/Pseudo R² 0.157 0.158 0.166 0.165 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.027 
LR Chi-Square     36.07*** 35.10*** 34.82*** 35.17*** 
Log Likelihood     -628.508 -619.736 -630.097 -620.661 
Fisher  9.45*** 9.17*** 10.06*** 9.61***     
Banks 137 137 137 137     
Observations  651 633 651 633 650 632 650 632 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.  IV: Instrumental 
Variable.  na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. 
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Tables 2 and 3 present QR findings corresponding respectively to public credit 
registries  and private credit bureaus  Each table has two sets of specifications corresponding 
to mobile phone penetration and internet penetration. Consistent differences in information 
sharing offices estimated coefficients between OLS and quintiles (in terms of sign, 
significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of complementing the Fixed 
Effects and Tobit regressions with estimations throughout the conditional distribution of the 
Lerner index. 
 The following findings can be established from Table 2. In the 75
th 
quartile on the 
right-hand-side for regressions pertaining to internet penetration, the net effect on market 
power from the interaction between public credit registries and internet penetration is -0.005 
(([0.0002 × 7.809] + (-0.007)). In the computation, 7.809 is the mean value of instrumented 
internet penetration, -0.007 is the unconditional effect of public credit registries while -0.0002 
is the corresponding conditional impact from the interaction between public credit registries 
and internet penetration. In Table 3, positive net effects are apparent from the 50
th
 quartile to 
the  90
th
 decile on left-hand-side. It follows that the interaction between mobile phones and 
private credit bureaus has positive net effects on market power in top quintiles of the Lerner 
index. The mean value of instrumented mobile phone required for the computation of net 
effects is 37.019.  
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Table 2: Public Credit Registries, ICT and Market Power (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Lerner Index 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.195 -0.001 0.422*** 0.675*** 0.740*** 0.778*** 0.218 0.181 0.418*** 0.622*** 0.714*** 0.818*** 
 (0.429) (0.991) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.364) (0.276) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.001 0.001* 0.0007 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.104) (0.053) (0.335) (0.418) (0.767) (0.436)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.004 -0.002 -0.005** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
       (0.285) (0.667) (0.044) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) 0.014 0.015 0.0004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006* -0.007** -0.005 
 (0.440) (0.276) (0.971) (0.335) (0.382) (0.770) (0.604) (0.774) (0.306) (0.079) (0.020) (0.221) 
PCR(IV) ×Mobile Phones(IV) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00002 0.00006 0.00004 0.00002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.440) (0.298) (0.848) (0.381) (0.426) (0.585)       
PCR(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001 
       (0.736) (0.709) (0.667) (0.147) (0.015) (0.174) 
GDPpcg 0.001 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.00009 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0002 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.650) (0.897) (0.883) (0.916) (0.968) (0.974) (0.855) (0.568) (0.409) (0.879) (0.468) (0.357) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.002 -0.0001 0.00008 0.001 0.0006 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.0003 0.002** 0.001 
 (0.235) (0.423) (0.957) (0.954) (0.161) (0.568) (0.166) (0.192) (0.410) (0.771) (0.042) (0.434) 
Pop. density -0.0001 0.00001 -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0001 0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00008 -0.0001 -0.00006 -0.0001 0.00006 
 (0.340) (0.960) (0.304) (0.079) (0.154) (0.761) (0.234) (0.758) (0.438) (0.319) (0.122) (0.468) 
Deposit/Assets 0.138 -0.017 -0.072 -0.126*** -0.110*** -0.094*** 0.170 -0.035 -0.001 -0.099*** -0.095*** -0.068* 
 (0.528) (0.887) (0.445) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.448) (0.812) (0.983) (0.006) (0.003) (0.064) 
Bank Branches 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.016** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.021 
 (0.562) (0.595) (0.407) (0.033) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.419) 
Price of Loan 2.221 1.718*** 0.427 -0.208 -0.505** -0.352 2.180 1.067 -0.018 -0.086 -0.432** -0.685** 
 (0.105) (0.007) (0.328) (0.363) (0.029) (0.157) (0.122) (0.211) (0.962) (0.615) (0.020) (0.016) 
Quantity of Loan  -0.021 0.0003 0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.013** -0.018 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.009* 0.006 
 (0.330) (0.981) (0.916) (0.455) (0.637) (0.017) (0.399) (0.872) (0.930) (0.807) (0.071) (0.330) 
Small Banks  -0.153** -0.086* -0.076 -0.033 -0.019 -0.048** -0.117* -0.079 -0.004 -0.012 -0.006 -0.021 
 (0.025) (0.093) (0.106) (0.182) (0.388) (0.020) (0.074) (0.215) (0.906) (0.527) (0.728) (0.419) 
Domestic Banks 0.203** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.063*** 0.025 0.021 0.199* 0.127** 0.068** 0.051*** 0.007 0.024 
 (0.034) (0.003) (0.004) (0.00) (0.125) (0.168) (0.051) (0.021) (0.035) (0.000) (0.585) (0.184) 
Islamic Banks  0.069 0.091 -0.038 -0.084 0.029 -0.001 0.010 0.026 -0.174 -0.166*** -0.077* 0.036 
 (0.412) (0.402) (0.717) (0.121) (0.535) (0.971) (0.898) (0.893) (0.101) (0.000) (0.093) (0.584) 
Net effect of the Mobile Phone  Na na na na na na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- na na na na -0.005 na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.053 0.059 0.037 0.050 0.058 0.081 0.052 0.054 0.039 0.051 0.064 0.082 
Fisher  3.65***      3.07***      
Observations  650 650 650 650 650 650 632 632 632 632 632 632 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least.  
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Table 3: Private Credit Bureaus, ICT and Market Power (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Lerner Index 
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.243 -0.044 0.391*** 0.676*** 0.754*** 0.817*** 0.247 0.024 0.379*** 0.641*** 0.748*** 0.822*** 
 (0.294) (0.752) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.276) (0.870) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phones(IV) 0.001 0.001 -0.00001 0.0004* 0.0001 0.0003 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.238) (0.110) (0.984) (0.081) (0.798) (0.350)       
Internet (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002* -0.001 
       (0.139) (0.558) (0.462) (0.013) (0.094) (0.151) 
PCB (IV) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** -0.0002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.505) (0.432) (0.115) (0.000) (0.003) (0.015) (0.846) (0.132) (0.257) (0.247) (0.048) (0.064) 
PCB(IV) ×Mobile Phones(IV) -0.000005 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002** -0.00003** -0.00002* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.764) (0.644) (0.532) (0.020) (0.038) (0.074)       
PCB(IV) ×Internet(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00001 0.000002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
       (0.336) (0.330) (0.941) (0.977) (0.174) (0.259) 
GDPpcg 0.002 0.001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 -0.004 -0.0008 0.0008 0.001 -0.0006 
 (0.488) (0.800) (0.855) (0.906) (0.732) (0.884) (0.885) (0.474) (0.834) (0.656) (0.475) (0.741) 
Inflation  -0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.0006 0.003** 0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.229) (0.479) (0.543) (0.428) (0.013) (0.286) (0.181) (0/724) (0.629) (0.891) (0.030) (0.044) 
Pop. density -0.000003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000001 0.00004 0.0001* 0.000002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000003 0.000001 0.0001** 
 (0.979) (0.325) (0.355) (0.998) (0.528) (0.082) (0.985) (0.347) (0.343) (0.957) (0.987) (0.049) 
Deposit/Assets 0.141 -0.020 -0.046 -0.074*** -0.105*** -0.051 0.175 -0.071 -0.014 -0.060* -0.085** -0.053* 
 (0.514) (0.875) (0.559) (0.006) (0.009) (0.128) (0.442) (0.614) (0.867) (0.098) (0.014) (0.086) 
Bank Branches 0.006** 0.007 0.005 0.003** 0.004** 0.002** 0.016*** 0.013* 0.007 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 
 (0.025) (0.133) (0.137) (0.018) (0.015) (0.044) (0.001) (0.077) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price of Loan 1.874 1.493** 0.158 -0.373*** -0.799*** -0.699*** 1.898 0.959 0.239 -0.312* -0.745*** -0.721*** 
 (0.154) (0.012) (0.659) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.146) (0.193) (0.551) (0.064) (0.000) (0.002) 
Quantity of Loan  -0.023 0.009 0.0006 -0.012*** -0.003 0.001 -0.020 0.021 0.001 -0.005 0.0006 0.001 
 (0.276) (0.480) (0.949) (0.002) (0.593) (0.736) (0.370) (0.226) (0.892) (0.342) (0.912) (0.809) 
Small Banks  -0.147** -0.099* -0.041 -0.044*** -0.004 -0.055*** -0.123* -0.065 -0.036 -0.022 -0.011 -0.040** 
 (0.024) (0.065) (0.272) (0.002) (0.836) (0.006) (0.053) (0.213) (0.386) (0.256) (0.587) (0.038) 
Domestic Banks 0.207** 0.145*** 0.070** 0.056*** 0.029 0.021 0.199* 0.163*** 0.062* 0.045*** 0.016 0.020 
 (0.038) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.113) (0.188) (0.053) (0.001) (0.061) (0.002) (0.316) (0.229) 
Islamic Banks  0.069 0.106 0.0006 -0.060** 0.021 0.014 0.017 0.092 -0.152* -0.169*** -0.108** 0.041* 
 (0.373) (0.325) (0.994) (0.049) (0.668) (0.706) (0.839) (0.600) (0.089) (0.001) (0.033) (0.096) 
Net effect of the Mobile Phone  Na na na 0.003 0.004 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Net effect of the Internet --- --- --- --- --- --- na na na na na na 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.052 0.061 0.043 0.060 0.073 0.100 0.054 0.059 0.044 0.058 0.071 0.098 
Fisher  4.12***      4.14***      
Observations  650 650 650 650 650 650 632 632 632 632 632 632 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least.  
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5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
This study has assessed how market power in the African banking industry is affected by the 
complementarity between information sharing offices and ICT. The empirical evidence is 
based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 countries for the period 2001-2011. Four estimation 
techniques are employed, namely: (i) instrumental variable Fixed Effects to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity; (ii)  Tobit regressions to control for the limited range in the 
dependent variable; and (iii) instrumental Quantile Regressions(QR) to account for initial 
levels of market power. Whereas results from Fixed Effect and Tobit regressions are not 
significant, with QR: (i) the interaction between internet penetration and public credit 
registries reduces market power in the 75
th
 quartile and (ii) the interaction between mobile 
phone penetration and private credit bureaus increases market power in the top quintiles.  
Fortunately, the positive net effects are associated with negative marginal effects from the 
interaction between private credit bureaus and mobile phone penetration. This implies that 
mobile phones could complement private credit bureaus to decrease market power when 
certain thresholds of mobile phone penetration are attained. We briefly discuss these 
thresholds.  
In order for mobile phones to change the unconditional positive effects of private 
credit bureaus to negative impacts in the top quintiles of the Lerner index, the following 
mobile phone thresholds are essential: respectively, 150 (0.003/0.00002), 100 (0.003/0.00003) 
and 100 (0.002/0.00002)  for  the 50
th
, 75
th
 quartiles and 90
th
 decile. The last-two thresholds 
make economic sense because they are within the range of mobile phone penetration 
disclosed by the summary statistics (0.000 to 147.202). It follows that in top quintiles of 
market power, the negative marginal effects from the interaction between mobile phones and 
private credit bureaus can convert the unconditional positive effect of private credit bureaus 
on the Lerner index into overall negative effects on market power, once certain thresholds in 
mobile phone penetration are reached, notably: 100 mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 
people).  
It is also important to provide some explanation on why a substantial part of the 
findings is insignificant. Accordingly, the insignificant results invite us to infer that 
information sharing offices are still not significantly reducing market power. Two arguments 
can be advanced to substantiate this insignificance. On the one hand, information sharing 
offices may not be fulfilling the anticipated objectives of rendering credit markets contestable, 
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sharing information to boost competition and decreasing informational rents (Pagano & 
Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). On the other hand, ICT may not be effective in disclosing accurate 
and timely information.  
 In the light of the above, the insignificant findings which can be explained should not 
be viewed in the light of publication bias or a file drawer concern in social sciences, where 
strong findings are favoured in placed of null or insignificant results (Franco et al., 2014; 
Rosenberg, 2005).Future studies can enrich the extant literature by examining whether the 
established relationships are apparent within comparative frameworks, notably, in terms of 
bank: size (large vs. small); ownership (foreign versus (vs) domestic) and ‘compliance with 
Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of empirical literature on the abuse of market power 
Author(s) Regions (Period) Abuse of market power? 
   
Tu & Chen (2000)  Taiwan (1986-1999) Yes 
   
Weill (2004) Europe (1994-1999) No 
   
Maudos & de Guevara (2007) Europe (1993-2002) No 
   
Koetter & Vins (2008) Germany (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Koetter et al. (2008) USA (1986-2006) No 
   
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) Czech Republic (1994-2005)  No 
   
Schaeck & Cihak (2008) Europe & USA (1995-2005) Yes 
   
Al-Jarrah & Gharaibeh (2009) Jordan (2001-2005) No 
   
 
Solis & Maudos (2008)  
 
Mexico (1993-2005) 
No (for deposit market) 
Yes (for loans market) 
   
Al-Muharrami & Mathews (2009)  Arab Gulf (1993-2002) No 
   
Fan & Marton (2011) SEE  (1998-2008) No 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009) China (1985-2002) No 
   
Delis & Tsionas (2009) Europe (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009)  China (1985-2002) No 
   
Punt &van Rooij(2009) EU (1992-1997) No 
   
Ariss (2010) A sample of developing countries 
(1999-2005) 
Yes (cost efficiency) 
 No (profit efficiency) 
   
Coccorese & Pellecchia (2010) Italy (1992-2007) Yes 
   
Tetsushi et al. (2012) Japan (1974-2005) Yes 
   
Titko & Dauylbaev (2015) Baltic countries (2007-2013) No 
   
Sources: Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010); Titko and Dauylbaev (2015) and Authors. SEE: South East European countries. EU: Europe 
Union.  
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Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Market Power  Lerner The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Internet Penetration   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Quantity   Quantity  Logarithm of Loans   BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner Index 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Information  Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
Asymmetry Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
ICT Mobile phones 34.107 32.409 0.000 147.202 1776 
Internet  7.268 8.738 0.037 51.000 1757 
       
 
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita 
growth 
13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
 
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Indep: Independent. 
Vble: Variable.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size : 684) 
                   
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls ICT Info. Sharing Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Mobile Internet PCR PCB   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.261 -0.122 0.019 -0.163 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.315 -0.238 -0.205 -0.178 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.056 0.335 0.546 -0.233 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.087 -0.036 -0.038 -0.083 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.610 0.747 0.602 0.139 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.206 -0.219 -0.342 0.094 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 -0.118 -0.096 0.007 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 0.146 0.089 -0.084 0.080 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 -0.146 -0.089 0.084 -0.080 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.151 0.039 0.010 0.187 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.151 0.039 -0.010 -0.187 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.045 -0.039 -0.014 -0.071 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.045 -0.032 0.014 0.071 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 0.634 0.304 0.519 0.099 Mobile 
              1.000 0.513 -0.010 0.045 Internet 
               1.000 -0.151 0.051 PCR 
                1000 0.091 PCB 
                 1.000 Lerner 
                   
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small 
banks. Lsize: Large banks. Open: Capital openness. Closed: Capital closeness. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: 
Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. Internet: internet penetration.   
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684. 
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